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Introduction
Computer historians remember Thomas Watson, the
first chairman of IBM, for two famous quotes. The first
was IBM’s motto: “THINK”. It became a commonly
repeated word, being printed on the cover of notebooks,
scratchpads, and even matchbooks. “THINK” magazine
was distributed monthly to IBM employees.1 In light of
this high-minded credo, it is perhaps ironic that the
second quote, for which Mr Watson is more notoriously
remembered, is as follows:
“I think there is a world market for maybe five
computers.” 2
That attitude persisted in the industry for the next few
decades. Even thirty-four years later in 1977, Ken Olson,
the President of Digital Equipment Corp (the
predecessor to Hewlett Packard and Compaq) is alleged
to have remarked “There is no need for any individual to
have a computer in their home.” As absurd as these
statements may seem today, history will forgive Messrs.
Watson and Olson. These were men at the very forefront
of their field and even they could not envisage the full
scope of the revolution that they themselves were in the
process of ushering in. Nor could they have imagined
how rapidly the revolution would come.
In 1980, three years after Mr. Olson’s remark,
approximately twelve companies sold 724,000
computers worldwide. The following year, twenty more
companies, including IBM, entered the market, and
sales doubled to 1.4 million units. In 1982, Time
magazine named the computer its ‘Machine of the Year’
and predicted that by year’s end, more than 100
companies would sell 2.8 million personal computers.3
Just like that, personal computing had grown from
professional niche into a multi-billion dollar industry
with no sign of slowing down.
Yet even as the computer revolution kicked into high
gear, the dangers posed by the revolution were still
being misapprehended. In the Time article proclaiming
the computer “Machine of the Year,” concerned experts
laboured over the potential consequences that social
assimilation of the computer might cause. Would the
human brain stupefy as computers began making our
decisions for us? Would assimilation of computers into
society at large lead to the establishment of an
“intellectual ruling class”? Professor Marvin Minsky of
M.I.T. is quoted in the same Time article as stating that,
“[t]he desktop revolution has brought the tools that
only professionals have had into the hands of the
public. God knows what will happen now.”
Today, there are over 1.8 billion personal computers in
use and that number is projected to reach 2 billion by
2015.4 If the visionaries who conceived and developed
the modern computer could not foresee the magnitude
of how their ideas would become part of our daily lives
and develop at an increasing speed, the idea that their
invention would become the vehicle for an entirely new
genre of crime was far beyond comprehension. Yet,
while experts fretted about how the computer might
result in social upheaval, the real social threat –
cybercrime – was coalescing.
In this article, we examine the origins and current
status of cybercrime, and identify the governing laws in
the United States.
A brief introduction to cybercrime 
In February 2009, 56 year-old Dave Crouse of Chicago,
Illinois was surprised when a number of small but
suspicious charges – $37 and $17.98 – appeared on his
bank account. Six months later, $3,200 in unexplained
debits was incurred in one day. He closed his accounts
and opened new ones at a different bank. The very next
day, his bank charged him $1,100. By February 2010,
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nearly $1 million in merchandise, gambling, and
telephone-services charges had been debited to his
accounts or charged in his name. His attempts to
salvage his finances have cost him nearly $100,000 and
have reduced his savings and retirement accounts. In
the middle of this nightmare, Dave lost his job in the
construction industry. Soon he found that not only had
hackers taken his money, they also cost him his
livelihood. Although he holds a doctoral degree in
organizational psychology and has a long history of
contracting work at U.S. federal facilities, Mr Crouse
failed to find a job. Finally, one recruiter explained that
companies were rejecting him because his credit
reports were so poor and his debt was mounting. Soon,
his security clearance to work on government buildings
was terminated. When he asked how this could have
happened, the bank told him that malicious software
was probably the cause of the problem. Mr Crouse was
an avid on-line shopper, banked on-line, frequented
eBay, purchased music on-line, and used his ATM card
like a credit card. Unfortunately for Mr Crouse,
somewhere in his on-line travels, his computer had
become infected with a keystroke logger. The program
picked up all his personal information by tracking every
key he struck and transmitted it somewhere in the
world to the program’s author. Dave Crouse’s life has
been decimated by cybercrime. And he is not the only
one. In 2009, one in every twenty Americans was the
victim of some form of misappropriation of identity
(commonly known as identity theft) – a new record –
according to a recent study by Javelin Strategy and
Research. That figure is up 12 per cent over 2008 and is
37 per cent ahead of 2007. “The odds have never been
higher for becoming a fraud victim,” said James Van
Dyke, Javelin president and founder. “It’s an easy crime
to perpetrate, a crime that’s almost impossible to catch
when done in a sophisticated manner and a crime in
which enforcement is very limited.”5
Despite the increasing and nearly universal danger,
cybercrime remains a threat that most people know
little about. The purpose of this article is to provide an
introduction to cybercrime from the perspective of the
United States of America. Four areas will serve as the
focus of the analysis: first, a historical and statistical
look at the origins and current state of cybercrime;
second, an examination of U.S. laws critical to the
prosecution of cybercrime in America; third, the
identification and discussion of unique problems posed
to the investigation and prosecution of cybercrime as
illustrated by selected case law, and finally, we will
conclude by briefly exploring the special challenge of
the judiciary in presiding over cybercrime prosecutions
and enforcing cybercrime laws.
The origins and current state of cybercrime 
Hackers and the origins of cybercrime 
The first “hackers” emerged in the 1960s at M.I.T. and
were more interested in toy trains than computers. They
were members of a model train enthusiast group on
campus who modified and rerouted toy train tracks and
switches to make them perform faster and differently.6
The term “hack” meant an elegant, witty or inspired
way of getting things done.7 M.I.T. students being M.I.T.
students, it was not long before some of these train
hackers began employing their rigging skills to the new
mainframe computing systems being studied and
developed on campus. The computer hacker was born.
Inevitably, inspiration turned to exploitation. The first
instance of network hacking occurred in 1972 when a
man named John Draper discovered that a toy whistle
given away inside Cap’n Crunch cereal generated a tone
at 2600 MHz. This was the same frequency that enabled
a person to obtain access to AT&T’s long-distance
switching system. Mr Draper, who became known by the
moniker ‘Cap’n Crunch’, built a device he called a “blue
box” that used the tone to make free telephone calls.
Telephone hackers became known as “phreakers” and
included Steve Wozniak and Steve Jobs, future founders
of Apple Computer, who launched a home industry
making and selling blue boxes.8 
The internet
As clever as Cap’n Crunch and his contemporaries
certainly were, their skills would have been of limited
applicability without a means of obtaining access to
their targets. A new Ferrari, beautiful as it may be,
would be useless without a road upon which to travel.
Fortunately for these hackers, the internet was already
in the process of becoming both viable and accessible.
If the computer was the vehicle of the cyber criminal,
the internet was about to become the highway.
The internet was conceived as a child of the space
5 The facts outlined are taken from Jennifer Waters,
“Identity fraud nightmare: One man’s story,”
MarketWatch 10 February 2010 at
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-rise-of-
identity-theft-one-mans-nightmare-2010-02-10.
6 PCWorld.com Staff, “Timeline: A 40-year history
of hacking” CNN.com/SCI-TECH, 19 November
2001, at http://archives.cnn.com/2001/
TECH/internet/11/19/hack.history.idg/
7 Mark Ward, “Hacking: A history” BBC News
Online, 27 October 2000, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/
994700.stm.
8 PCWorld.com Staff, “Timeline: A 40-year history
of hacking”.
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race in the late 1950s. On October 4, 1957 the Soviet
Union launched the Sputnik satellite into orbit. Upon
realizing that the Russians were in space and had
developed the capacity to rapidly exploit military
technology, the United States quickly passed legislation
to address the nation’s perceived technological
shortcomings. Among the entities thereby created were
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) and the Advanced Research Projects Agency
(ARPA). Four months later, NASA put a U.S. satellite into
orbit. Nine months later, on December 18, 1958, the first
communications satellite was launched and relayed a
Christmas message from President Dwight D.
Eisenhower to the world. America’s space program was
not all one-upsmanship and season’s greetings,
however – U.S. satellites were soon employed to create
a network that enabled all elements of the military and
government to maintain communications with one
another under all circumstances.
Unprecedented as the U.S.’s new satellite network
may have been, the technology was still very basic, and
then, as now, was not without its flaws. Chief among
them was that computers could only communicate to a
single other computer to which it was directly linked.
This lack of interconnectivity defined the problem that
ARPA researchers worked for the next ten years to
solve. Finally, in 1969, ARPA linked four host computers
located at UCLA, the University of Utah, Stanford, and
UC Santa Barbara. This network was called the
ARPANet. By the spring of 1970, the ARPANet was linked
to the east coast. In 1973, the network was linked by
satellite to Hawaii and Norway. ARPANet continued to
increase at the rate of one host every 23 days through
the early 1980s. In 1982, the advent of the internet
protocol allowed different networks to connect to each
other. The foundation of the internet as we know it
today had been laid.9
By the early 1980s, hackers had taken notice of the
fledgling internet, and were already using electronic
bulletin boards to gossip, trade tips, and share stolen
computer passwords and credit card numbers.
Particularly brazen hackers and groups of hackers had
taken to infiltrating defense and corporate computer
systems. In 1983, a group known as the 414 gang broke
into computers at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, a
facility that helps to develop nuclear weapons.10 While
Time magazine might have missed the activities of
hackers, it did not take long for the wave of sensitive
network break-ins to catch the attention of the United
States government. In 1984, Congress passed the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), making it a
crime to break into government and financial institution
computer systems.11 Despite Congress’ intentions, the
CFAA could do little to stem the tide of computer crime.
When the CFAA was passed, internet users numbered
only a few thousand – mostly university researchers and
government agencies. By 1995 there were 16 million
people on the internet. It comes, then, as no surprise
that the world saw a statistical explosion in cybercrime
starting in the 1990s.
Today there are over 1.8 billion internet users.12 As
internet use has increased and technology has evolved,
hackers have been presented not only with more targets
but also with new, more lucrative, opportunities.
According to a 2009 survey by Javelin Research, 47 per
cent of households in the United States – over 70
million13 people – now do their banking on-line.14
Another 22 million,15 or 50 per cent,16 do the same in the
UK. Likewise, Craigslist has over 50 million users;17
PayPal has over 78 million active accounts,18 and eBay
stopped counting after reaching 125 million users.19 The
internet has mutated from its genesis as a hub for
researchers and government agencies to share
information, and turned into a bustling center of
international commerce. Suffice it to say, cybercrime has
not lagged behind.
Cybercrime today
Perhaps the most telling statistics are not those that
demonstrate how many people are doing their business
on-line or why, but rather how many are not and why
they are not. Among those who choose not to do their
banking on-line, 41 per cent of consumers in the U.S.
and 38 per cent in the UK credited security concerns as
their most important reason for not banking over the
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9 “Internet History,” Computer History Museum,
2006 Computer History Museum, 2006, at
http://www.computerhistory.org/internet_history/.
10 PCWorld.com Staff, “Timeline: A 40-year history of
hacking”.
11 Congress perhaps still did not understand all the
aspects of cybercrime: the original version of the
CFAA excluded juveniles from its purview.
12 “Internet Usage Statistics” Internet World Stats,
31 December 2009, at
http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm.
13 Brian O’Connell, “Study: Do Customers Prefer
Online Banks?” BankingMyWay.com, 2010, at
http://www.bankingmyway.com/save/study-do-
customers-prefer-online-banks (citing the 2009
study by Javelin Research).
14 Lance Whitney, “Online banking is booming” cnet
News, 16 June 2009, at
http://news.cnet.com/8301-1001_3-10265409-
92.html.
15 “Half of UK net users bank online” Finextra.com,
12 January 2010, at
http://www.finextra.com/news/fullstory.aspx?news
itemid=20938.
16 Lance Whitney, “Online banking is booming”.
17 “Site Profile for Craigslist.org” Compete Site
Analytics, 20 March 2010, at
http://siteanalytics.compete.com/craigslist.org/.
18 “About Us” Paypal, 15 April 2010, at
https://www.paypal-media.com/aboutus.cfm.
19 Mary Jayne McKay, “eBay’s Bid For Success -
Internet Auction Site Racking Up Big Gains” CBS
60 Minutes, 5 January 2005, at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/10/30/60II/
main527542.shtml.
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internet.20 These consumers are right to be cautious,
because current laws in the U.S. identify at least thirty
different types of cybercrime. Given the pervasiveness
of the threat and the high level of risk posed to
consumers and corporations around the world, perhaps
it is a wonder that so many people link their finances to
the internet.
Statistics: costs and losses from cybercrime
While the precise magnitude of the financial cost of
cybercrime is unknown, recent studies provide at least a
rough framework for analysis. In 2005, the U.S.
Government Accountability Office (GAO) estimated the
annual loss due to computer crime for U.S.
organizations to be $67.5 billion.21 A 2009 study
conducted by Javelin Strategy and Research found that
losses from on-line misappropriation of identity caused
losses of $54 billion to U.S. consumers and
businesses.22 A 2009 study by McAfee found that data
theft and breaches from cybercrime may have cost
businesses as much as $1 trillion globally in lost
intellectual property and expenditures for repairing the
damage last year.23 As high as these figures are, what is
most troubling is that all reports indicate that
cybercrime is increasing at an increasingly rapid pace.
Incidents of misappropriation of identity rose 12 per
cent from 2008 to 2009. According to the U.S. Federal
Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Internet Crime Complaint
Center (IC3), the loss, just from cases referred to the
IC3, amounted to $559.7 million in 2009.24 This figure is
an increase of 212 per cent from 2008 ($264.6 million)
and an increase of 667.8 per cent (from $83.9 million) in
2001. 336,655 complaints were submitted to IC3 in
2009, a 22.3 per cent increase from 275,284 in 2008,
and a 62.7 per cent increase from 206,884 in 2007.25
According to the 2008 Computer Security Institute (CSI)
Annual Computer Crime and Security Survey, the
average cost of computer financial fraud to businesses
and institutions that suffer it is $500,000.26 For its 2009
report, CSI compiled data from 443 U.S. based
respondents across the public and private sectors. Not
surprisingly, the survey results indicated that
cybercrime remains on the rise: 64.3 per cent of
respondents experienced infection by malicious
software, compared to 50 per cent in 2008; 29.2 per
cent experienced denial-of-service attacks, compared to
21 per cent in 2008; 17.3 per cent experienced password
sniffing, compared to 9 per cent in 2008, and 13.5 per
cent experienced web site defacement, compared to 6
per cent in 2008.27 
This brief survey represents limited results from
discrete surveys. Nevertheless the message is clear:
cybercrime presents significant and increasing threat to
consumers, businesses, financial institutions, and
governments all over the world.
Criminology: Modern cybercrime and the cyber
criminal 
Current laws in the U.S. provide for at least 30 different
types of substantive cybercrime, including Denial of
Service Attacks; Substitution or Redirection of a web
site; Use of a Misleading Domain Name; Extortion;
Internet Fraud (e.g. auction fraud or “phishing”); Credit
Card Fraud; Sale of Prescription Drugs and Controlled
Substances; Sale of Firearms; Gambling; Sale of
Alcohol; Securities Fraud; Piracy and Intellectual
Property Theft; Trade Secrets/Economic Espionage;
Electronic Threats; Electronic Harassment; Interception
of Electronic Communications; Cyber stalking;
Espionage; Hate Crimes; Libel/Slander; Posting
Personal Information on a Website (e.g., telephone
numbers and addresses); Invasion of Privacy; Disclosure
of Private Information; Spam; and Spoofing Email
Addresses.
The culmination of many of these subsets of
cybercrime, particularly those related to fraud and
misappropriation of identity, is a new underground
industry known as “carding.” According to the U.S.
Secret Service, “[c]ybercrime has evolved significantly,
from dumpster diving and credit card skimming to full-
20 Gartner Press release “Gartner Survey Shows
Number of Consumers in the U.S. and U.K. Using
Online Banking Continues to Grow Across Income
and Ages”, June 15, 2009, at
http://www.gartner.com/it/page.jsp?id=1020212
in respect of the Gartner report “Gartner
Consumer Survey Shows That Barriers to Online
Banking Use Continue to Fall”.
21 “Report to Congressional Requesters -
CYBERCRIME: Public and Private Entities Face
Challenges in Addressing Cyber Threats” U.S.
Government Accountability Office (U.S. GAO, 70-
705 June 2007), at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07705.pdf.
22 Jennifer Waters, “Identity fraud nightmare: One
man’s story,” MarketWatch 10 February 2010.
23 Elinor Mills, “Study: Cybercrime cost firms $1
trillion globally,” cnet News, 28 January 2009, at
http://news.cnet.com/8301-1009_3-10152246-
83.html.
24 United States Federal Bureau of Investigation
Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) “2009
Internet Crime Report” National White Collar
Crime Center (NW3C), at
http://www.ic3.gov/media/annualreport/2009_IC
3Report.pdf.
25 2009 Internet Crime Report” National White
Collar Crime Center (NW3C): This total includes
many different complaint types, including both
fraudulent and non-fraudulent crimes. Yet,
research indicates that only one in seven
incidents of fraud ever make their way to the
attention of enforcement or regulatory agencies.
26 Robert Richardson, “2008 CSI Computer Crime &
Security Survey” Computer Security Institute, at
http://www.cse.msstate.edu/~cse6243/readings/
CSIsurvey2008.pdf.
27 Hilton Collins, “CSI Computer Crime and Security
Survey Shows Poor Security Awareness Training
in Public and Private Sectors,” Computer Crime
Research Center, 12 January 2010 at
http://www.crime-research.org/news/
12.01.2010/3758/.
CYBERCRIME: ISSUES AND CHALLENGES IN THE UNITED STATES
23© Pario Communications Limited, 2010 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, Vol 7
fledged online bazaars full of stolen personal and
financial information.”28 In contrast to other types of
misappropriation of identity, carding involves the large-
scale theft of credit card account numbers and other
financial information. As opposed to phishing and other
means of misappropriation of identity, where the
number of victims rarely exceeds several hundred, or in
rare cases, a few thousand, carding is a global
enterprise that often involves thousands of victims, and
in some cases, millions.
A portrait of a new criminal activity
A man by the name of Max Butler serves to illustrate the
development of the carding “profession”. Butler began
his hacking career as a teenager in Idaho, dabbling in
telephone phreaking and reading hacker magazines in
class. After his parents divorced in 1984, Butler found a
new home on the internet and found a community on
hacker message boards. Intelligent but socially
awkward, Butler struggled with bullies through high
school. In 1990, his first girlfriend broke up with him
and he responded by putting his hands around her
throat and threatening to kill her. In 1991, he was
sentenced to five years in prison for the incident.29 After
his release from prison in 1995, Butler put his hacking
skills to legitimate use. He earned a good living working
as a network security auditor for corporate clients as
well as the FBI. Butler’s life as a white hat30 would be
short-lived, however. In 1998, Butler took it upon
himself to hack into several government and military
networks and fix a network security hole. In the process
of doing so, however, Butler installed a small backdoor,
securing for himself personal access to military bases,
nuclear laboratories, and the U.S. Departments of
Commerce, Transportation, and the Interior as well as
the National Institute of Health. He was soon back in
jail: in May 2001 he was sentenced to eighteen months
in Taft federal prison. As the report by Poulsen
indicates, it was this period in prison that would change
the nature of Butler’s hacking. Previously, Butler had
hacked for the challenge and the personal
accomplishment of breaking into supposedly secure
systems. Butler was about to begin his transformation
from trespasser to thief.
In prison, Butler met another hacker by the name of
Jeff Normington, serving a sentence for wire fraud. After
they were both released in 2002, Normington
introduced Butler to Christopher Aragon, a man with
capital and access to the criminal underworld. Aragon
and Butler would rent rooms at hotels in San Francisco
and use the antenna to locate the nearest high speed
network. From there, Butler would launch his attacks,
initially by stealing from other thieves. The stolen
identity information, PINs, passwords, and credit card
data was used to create false credit cards and go
shopping for luxury items that the two could easily
dispose of. He then began to hack into the systems of
regional banks and steal fresh credit card information.
He sold these to Aragon for upwards of $10,000 a
month. Aragon set up an office to coordinate the
operation: an assistant to help him with card printing
and programming, and attractive young women who
used the cards to buy expensive designer merchandise
for resale on eBay.
Butler later expanded his ‘business’ by creating a
carding site called CardersMarket.com. Within a year,
CardersMarket had 1,500 buyers and sellers dealing in
goods that ranged from simple stolen credit card
numbers to packages that provided entire stolen
identities including credit card and bank account
information, PINs, counterfeit passports, drivers
licenses, and Social Security Cards, birth certificates,
college student identity cards, health insurance cards,
and other false identification documents.31 Butler later
hacked into his four remaining competitors, transferred
all their members to CardersMarket and then deleted
their databases. Federal law enforcement officers took
action when it was discovered that an attack against
Capital One Bank was linked to a web site registered
from the same account as CardersMarket. Although
operating under an his alias, “Iceman”, nevertheless
traditional police investigations led them to Christopher
Aragon, and a search of his house revealed
incriminating evidence that led them directly to Butler.
While the Secret Service watched Butler’s residence, the
FBI obtained a secret court order that allowed agents to
monitor the IP addresses of visitors to CardersMarket.
The FBI soon realized that it was no coincidence that
several addresses were traced back to broadband
28 “Press Release: United States Secret Service’s
Operation Rolling Stone Nets Multiple Arrests,”
United States Secret Service, U.S. Department of




29 The facts relating to this case are largely taken
from Kevin Poulsen, “Catch Me If You Can,” Wired
Magazine, January 2009, pp 95-126 and the
authors wish to acknowledge credit to Mr
Poulsen’s article. For the ease of the reader,
references have not been repeated; the article is
also available on-line at http://www.wired.com/
images/press/pdf/maxbutler.pdf.
30 The term “white hat” refers to an ethical hacker
or penetration tester who focuses on securing
and protecting IT systems.
31 Kimberly Kiefer Peretti, “Data Breaches: What the
Underground World of “Carding” Reveals,” Santa
Clara Computer and High Technology Journal,
Volume 25 number 2 (2008), pp 375-413,
available on-line at http://www.chtlj.org/
volumes/v25#v025.i2.Peretti.pdf.
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subscribers living within a block of Butler’s apartment –
the neighbours from whom Butler was stealing Wi-Fi.
After he was arrested, the FBI found a million credit card
numbers on his hard drive. In total, Butler stole nearly 2
million credit card numbers from banks, businesses and
other hackers, which were used to obtain over $86
million in fraudulent charges.32 Under the recently
revised U.S. Sentencing Commission rules, it was the
equivalent of a $500 million bank robbery. Butler was
potentially looking at the first life sentence for hacking.
Max Butler changed his name to Max Ray Vision while
in prison. On February 12, 2010 Max Ray Vision was
sentenced to thirteen years in prison and was required
to pay $27.5 million in restitution. Despite being far less
than the maximum, at the time it was the largest-ever
prison sentence for a hacker.33
What may be most troublesome about this story is
that Vision’s enterprise can almost be considered to be
innocuous when compared to some of his
contemporaries.
Carding and misappropriation of identity have been
linked to the funding of meth addiction and narcotics
trafficking.34 Arguably even more alarming is that the
relationship between misappropriation of identity and
the funding of terrorism is well established.35 A
convicted terrorist in Indonesia, Imam Samudra,
specifically referred to the use of carding as a means of
funding terrorist activities. Samudra sought to fund the
2002 Bali nightclub bombings through credit card fraud.
In another case, three men used stolen credit card
numbers to fund jihadist web sites. The men were
members of one or more carding organizations of a
similar nature to CardersMarket.36
The Max Butler story and the cybercrime statistics
that precede it in this article may give rise to any
number of inferences. However, what is demonstrated
most clearly is the indisputable need for effective
practical and legal mechanisms for responding to this
growing threat. The next part of this article will explore
those mechanisms.
Cybercrime laws in the United States 
Thirty years ago, law enforcement agencies faced the
emerging threat of cybercrime without the aid of any
criminal statutes designed to deal with it. Wire fraud
and mail fraud laws were employed where possible, but
were often a poor fit for the conduct at issue.37
However, as early as 1983, the U.S. government began
to recognize the need for legislation that specifically
addressed computer crime. Beginning with 18 U.S.C. §
1030 of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984,38
the United States has vigilantly responded to this
evolving menace by regularly enacting new laws and
amending old ones as they become deficient. This
section will explore cybercrime laws in the U.S. by
focusing on three areas: the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act (CFAA) of 1986; other laws particularly relevant to
specific types of cybercrime; and future legislation
which may aid in dealing with such crimes.
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986 
Origins, purpose, and evolution
Faced with a wave of crimes not previously conceived,
Congress intended to provide law enforcement,
prosecutors, and computer users with “a clearer
statement of proscribed activity”.39 Rather than amend
criminal laws to account for computer-related offenses,
Congress opted to address the issue in a single, new
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1030.40 While 18 U.S.C. § 1030 was a
step in the right direction, it quickly became evident
that a more robust solution was necessary.
Congressional hearings on the matter culminated in
1986 with the passing of the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act (CFAA), which is the main item of federal legislation
dealing with computer crime.41 The initial purpose of the
CFAA was to protect classified information, financial
records, and credit information on government and
financial institution computers. To that end, the Act
amended 18 U.S.C. § 1030 in a number of ways. It added
additional penalties for fraud and related activities in
connection with access devices and computers, as well
32 Kevin Poulsen, “Superhacker Max Butler Pleads
Guilty,” Wired Magazine 29 June 2009,
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/06/butler
_court/.
33 That number has since been eclipsed. In March
2010, Albert Gonzales was sentenced to 20 years
in prison for leading a group of cybercriminals
that stole tens of millions of credit and debit card
numbers from several U.S. retailers.
34 Kimberly Kiefer Peretti, “Data Breaches: What the
Underground World of “Carding” Reveals,” at pp
391-92.
35 Kimberly Kiefer Peretti, “Data Breaches: What the
Underground World of “Carding” Reveals,” at pp
391-92.
36 Kimberly Kiefer Peretti, “Data Breaches: What the
Underground World of “Carding” Reveals,” at pp
391-92.
37 Wire fraud and mail fraud statutes have not been
abandoned in dealing with computer crime.
Having since been amended to encompass
computer-specific offenses, they are now
regularly charged in conjunction with cybercrime-
specific statutes and often carry stiffer penalties.
For example, see, 18 U.S.C. § 1343.
38 The CFAA amended 18 U.S.C. § 1030 of the
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984
39 Scott Eltringham, “Prosecuting Computer
Crimes” (United States Department of Justice -




40 Scott Eltringham, “Prosecuting Computer
Crimes”
41 The CFAA amended 18 U.S.C. § 1030.
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as additional protection for federal computers. It also
criminalized additional computer-related acts and
included provisions to penalize the theft of property via
computer that occurs as a part of a scheme to defraud;
to penalize those who intentionally alter, damage, or
destroy data belonging to others, and to criminalize
trafficking in passwords and similar items.
The Act was far more comprehensive than its
predecessor, but it was not without limitations.
Jurisdiction extended only to cases with “compelling
federal interest,” a phrase requiring either harm to
computers of the federal government or certain financial
institutions, or an effect on interstate commerce. Today,
the prevalence of the internet has rendered nearly all
computer use interstate in nature. At the time the CFAA
was originally enacted, however, this jurisdictional
language was far more limiting. Furthermore, despite
the fact that minors committed many of the higher-
profile computer crimes that had prompted the
legislation, the CFAA excluded minors from its purview.
Over the course of the last quarter-century, these
deficiencies have been remedied. The Act has been
amended eight times: in 1988, 1989, 1990, 1994, 1996,42
2001, by the USA Patriot Act 2002, and 2008 by the
Identity Theft Enforcement and Restitution Act. The 1994
amendments added a civil cause of action for victims of
cybercrime,43 while the Patriot Act amendments44 of
2001 made clear that “protected computers” includes
computers outside of the U.S. providing they affect
“interstate or foreign commerce or communications of
the United States”.45
Scope and applicability: Insider/Outsider
A dichotomy that pervades the CFAA is that of the
insider versus the outsider. The different provisions of
the CFAA apply differently – or may not apply at all –
depending on whether the perpetrator is an insider who
exceeds his authorization to protected computers or is
an outsider who possesses no authorization at all.
Traditional insider/outsider cases include U.S. v.
Czubinski, 106 F.3d 1096 (1st Cir. 1997) and U.S. v
Ivanov, 175 F.Supp.2d 367 (D.Conn.2001). In Czubinski,
an Internal Revenue Service employee was found to
have exceeded his authorized access to IRS computer
systems when he looked at taxpayer records for
personal purposes. Conversely in Ivanov, a Russian
intruder broke into an American company’s customer
database and was found to have acted without
authorization. This analysis applies to 18 U.S.C. §§
1030(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(3), (a)(4), (a)(5)(A)(ii), and
(a)(5)(A)(iii), discussed below.
The CFAA includes provisions where authorization is
not an element, including Damaging Without
Authorization,46 Trafficking in Passwords,47 and
Extortion Involving Threats to Damage a Computer.48
The Act contains seven criminal provisions which
prohibit the following acts: Obtaining National Security
Information; Compromising Confidentiality; Trespassing
in a Government Computer; Accessing to Defraud and
Obtain Value; Damaging a Computer or Information;
Trafficking in Passwords; and Threatening to Damage a
Computer.
Laws particularly relevant to specific threats 
Robust as the CFAA may be, its focus is often on crime
in the form of unauthorized access to computers and
systems. Accordingly, its scope is limited to crime at the
physical and temporal point of access to protected
systems – hacking. However, as computers have
become increasingly user-friendly, so too has
cybercrime. No longer does cybercrime necessitate
actual “hacking” by itself. Moreover, even those crimes
that do involve hacking often involve subsequent low-
tech components, which escape the purview of the
CFAA. To that end, the U.S. has promulgated laws to
address these acts.
Identity Theft, Phishing, and Carding
The Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998 
Section 1028(a)(7) of the Identity Theft and Assumption
Deterrence Act of 1998 18 U.S.C. § 1028 (ITAD) applies
to network crimes, and prohibits a person from
transferring, possessing, or using any means of
identification of another person without authorization
with the intent to engage in any activity that violates
Federal law. The Identity Theft Penalty Enhancement Act
of 2004 amended ITAD and added the offense of
aggravated identity theft.49 This scaled-up version adds
an additional two-year term of imprisonment for identity
42 The National Information Infrastructure
Protection Act of 1996 broadened the scope of
protection offered by the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Law by covering all computers attached to
the internet and, therefore all computers used in
interstate commerce. It also criminalized all
unauthorized access of computer files in order to
transmit classified government information;
intentional access of U.S. department or agency
non-public computers without permission; and
accessing protected computers, without or
beyond authorization, to defraud and obtain
something of value.
43 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g).
44 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2)(B).
45 See also U.S. v. Ivanov, 175, F.Supp.2d 367
(D.Conn. 2001) (Congress intended the
provisions of the CFAA to apply extraterritorially
to computers used either in interstate or in
foreign commerce).
46 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A)(i).
47 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(6).
48 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(7).
49 18 U.S.C. § 1028A.
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theft in connection with particular federal violations.
Access Device Fraud
Often charged alongside section 1028, section 1029 of
the Access Device Fraud Act 18 U.S.C. §1029 prohibits
the fraudulent use of “access devices” to steal money.
“Access device” is defined broadly as “any card, plate,
code, account number, electronic serial number, mobile
identification number, personal identification number, or
any other telecommunication service, equipment, or
instrument identifier, or other means of account access
that can be used, alone or in conjunction with another
access device, to obtain money, goods, services, or any
other thing of value, or that can be used to initiate a
transfer of funds (other than a transfer originated solely
by paper instrument).”50 Charges under section 1029
are useful in many types of phishing cases, where a
defendant uses fraudulent e-mails to obtain various
types of passwords and account numbers, and carding
cases where a defendant purchases, sells, or transfers
stolen bank account, credit card, or debit card
information. Conspiracy,51 wire fraud,52 and bank fraud53
statutes may also be applicable in prosecuting these
cases.
Spam
CAN-SPAM Act of 2003
The reader may recall from the introduction to this
article, that inaccurate forecasts are common. The
computer industry leaders of today are no different from
their predecessors. In 2004, at the World Economic
Forum, Bill Gates proclaimed that, “Two years from now,
spam54 will be solved.”55 Six years later, computer users
the world over still await that solution. In an effort to
control this problem, Congress passed the Controlling
the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography And
Marketing (CAN-SPAM) Act of 2003 18 U.S.C. § 1037.
Effective as of January 1, 2004, the Act sets the rules for
commercial e-mail. It establishes requirements for
commercial messages, bans false or misleading e-mail
header information, and prohibits deceptive subject
lines, gives recipients the right to be removed from
mailing lists, and provides tough penalties for
violations.56 Although civil and regulatory provisions are
the primary mechanism by which CAN-SPAM is
enforced, the act also contains both misdemeanor and
felony criminal provisions for particularly egregious
offenses.57
It will not surprise the reader that the CAN-SPAM has
not been totally successful. The reasons for its failure
are several. First, and perhaps most importantly, the Act
is not enforced.58 In its first four years, the Federal Trade
Commission brought only thirty actions against
spammers.59 This is particularly frustrating in light of
strong evidence that more rigid enforcement could
make drastic and immediate reductions in the volume of
in spam.60 Second, the sophistication of spammer
techniques has outpaced efforts to counter them.61
Third, in striking a necessary balance between private
and public enforcement (and thereby avoiding a tidal
wave of plaintiffs) Congress did not include a private
right of action for consumers.62 It is also fairly difficult
for internet service providers (ISPs) to gain the standing
necessary to initiate legal action.63
Other measures
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986
(ECPA), which amended the Wiretap Act, was intended
by Congress to afford privacy protection to electronic
communications.64 Title I prohibits the interception of
electronic communications, while Title II (also referred
to as the Stored Communications Act) prohibits access
to stored electronic information.65 The EPCA contains
exceptions for certain government or law enforcement
50 18 U.S.C. §1029(e)(1).
51 18 U.S.C. § 371.
52 18 U.S.C. § 1343.
53 18 U.S.C. § 1344.
54 Unsolicited commercial e-mail.
55 Martin Lee, “Six years later, CAN-SPAM Act leaves
spam problem unresolved” SC Magazine 16
February 2010, at http://www.scmaazineus.com/
six-years-later-can-spam-act-leaves-spam-
problem-unresolved/article/163857/.
56 Vanessa J. Reid, “Recent Developments in Private
Enforcement of the CAN-SPAM Act,” at
http://works.bepress.com/vanessa_reid/1; “The
CAN-SPAM Act: A Compliance Guide for Business,”
FTC Bureau of Consumer Protection (Federal Trade
Commission, September 2009), at
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/business/ecom
merce/bus61.shtm.
57 Scott Eltringham, “Prosecuting Computer Crimes”,
p 87.
58 Scott Bradner, “The CAN-SPAM Act as a warning,”
Security Central InfoWorld, 6 January 2009 at
http://www.infoworld.com/d/security-central/can-
spam-act-warning-613.
59 Scott Bradner, “The CAN-SPAM Act as a warning,”
Security Central InfoWorld.
60 Michael Osterman, “The spam problem was




61 Chris Thompson, “A Snowshoe Winter: Our
Discontent with CAN-SPAM,” Spamhaus.org, 25
February 2009, at http://www.spamhaus.org/
news.lasso?article=641; Martin Lee, “Six years
later, CAN-SPAM Act leaves spam problem
unresolved”.
62 Vanessa J. Reid, “Recent Developments in Private
Enforcement of the CAN-SPAM Act”.
63 See Haselton v. Quicken Loans, Inc, (2010 WL
1180353, March 23, 2010) and Gordon v.
Virtumundo, Inc., 575 F.3d 1040 (Court of Appeals,
9th Circuit 2009). For a short commentary, see
Kevin Thompson, “Standing under the CAN-SPAM
Act,” Cyberlaw Central, 2 April 2010, at
http://www.cyberlawcentral.com/2010/04/02/stan
ding-under-the-can-spam-act/.
64 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22 and 2701-12.
65 Orin S. Kerr, “A User’s Guide to the Stored
Communications Act”, 72 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1208
fn. 1 (2004) (discussing the distinction between
Title I and Title II to ECPA).
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entities,66 and for the entity providing the electronic
communication service.67
In the Ninth Circuit, a violation of Title I of ECPA
requires an interception simultaneous with its original
transmission, rather than at some later point when the
communication is stored. For example, in Bunnell v.
Motion Picture Ass’n of America, 567 F.Supp.2d 1148
(C.D.Cal. 2007), the defendant hacked into the plaintiffs’
e-mail system and reconfigured it so that every e-mail
message would be copied and forwarded to his e-mail
account. The court found that any communication
acquired when in storage – even if that storage lasted
only momentarily on the plaintiff’s server – was not
covered by the Wiretap Act. The Bunnell case cited an
earlier case – Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d
868 (9th Cir. 2002) – holding that a defendant who
gained access to the plaintiff’s secure web site and
viewed items there did not violate the Wiretap Act.
Counsel dealing with stored communications should
consult Title II of ECPA, the Stored Communications Act
(SCA). Generally, the SCA prohibits providers of
communication services from disclosing private
communications to certain persons or entities.68 The
SCA has been held to protect e-mail messages stored
on an ISP’s servers even after the ISP delivered the
messages and continued to store the messages for the
purpose of back-up protection.69
Future legislation
On March 23, 2010, U.S. Senators Kirsten Gillibrand (D-
NY) and Orrin Hatch (R-UT) introduced a bill entitled the
International Cybercrime Reporting and Cooperation
Act.70 The legislation seeks to deal with the ability of
cyber criminals to operate with impunity across
international borders, and would introduce new
protocols for addressing the problem.71 The bill would
require the President to annually assess and report to
Congress on the state of other nations’ use of
information and communications technologies (ICT) in
critical infrastructure, the extent and nature of
cybercrime based in each country, the adequacy and
effectiveness of each country’s legal and law
enforcement systems addressing cybercrime, and
countries’ protection of consumers and commerce on-
line. The President would also report on multilateral
efforts to prevent and investigate cybercrime, including
U.S. actions to promote such multilateral efforts.
Thereafter, the bill would require the U.S. to develop
programs for countries with low ICT penetration to
prevent cybercrime and develop action plans for
countries identified as cyber concern.
Evidentiary challenges
Yet another unexpected consequence of the computer
revolution has been the digitalization of evidence. The
major form of evidence is now digital.72 Yet as pervasive
as digital evidence may now be, it remains complicated
for investigators to find and preserve, and difficult for
lawyers and judges to adequately address in a court. It
is imperative that cybercrime investigators be familiar
with the technology underlying a cybercrime case, a
point noted by Sgt. Ronald Levine of the Foothill-DeAnza
College District Police Department in Los Altos Hills,
California, in words that are probably echoed by every
authority investigating cybercrimes across the globe: “If
an officer or deputy doesn’t have computer skills,
they’re going to have to come up to speed and
understand how the technology works before he or she
can become an effective investigator.”73 To that end, the
U.S. Department of Justice has published Forensic
Examination of Digital Evidence: A Guide for Law
Enforcement,74 which sets out important guidelines for
investigators to follow when investigating computer
crimes and serves as a valuable digital evidentiary
rubric for both prosecutors and defense counsel.
Foundational issues
Digital evidence must be authenticated to be admissible
into evidence.75 That is, it must be shown to be what the
proponent claims it is. Because of the ease with which
such evidence can be modified, authentication of digital
evidence is an even more critical and difficult task than
authentication of more traditional forms of tangible
66 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c)(3).
67 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c)(1); BI3 v. Hamor, 2009 WL
2192801 (N.D.Ill. July 15, 2009) (holding that the
statute did not protect against the interception of
messages on a web site by that web site’s
network director).
68 Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., Inc., 529 F.3d
892, 900 (9th Cir. 2008).
69 Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir.
2004).
70 The reference to this appears on the web sites of
both Senators.
71 Robert McMillan, “Proposed US law would single
out cybercrime havens,” Reuters, IDG News
Service\San Francisco Bureau, 23 March 2010, at
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUS190003768320
100324.
72 Stephen Mason, gen ed, International Electronic
Evidence (London: British Institute of International
and Comparative Law, 2008), p xxxviii.
73 David Griffith, “How To Investigate Cybercrime”
Police Magazine, 1 November 2003, at
http://www.policemag.com/Channel/Technology/Ar
ticles/2003/11/How-to-Investigate-
Cybercrime.aspx; this is starkly illustrated in the
case of State of Connecticut v. Julie Amero, (Docket
number CR-04-93292; Superior Court, New London
Judicial District at Norwich, GA 21; 3, 4 and 5
January 2007). For a detailed analysis of this case,
see Stephen Mason, gen ed, International
Electronic Evidence (2008) pp xxxvi-lxxv.
74 Available on-line at http://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffiles1/nij/199408.pdf
75 Federal Rule of Evidence 901(a).
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evidence. However, the task is made somewhat less
daunting by the permissive authentication standard
utilized in the U.S. Federal Rules of Evidence. The
proponent of the evidence need only make a prima facie
showing of authenticity “so that a reasonable juror
could find in favor of authenticity or identification.”76
Once the proponent clears this low hurdle, the probative
force of the evidence is an issue for the jury. At this
point, any doubts as to the authenticity of the evidence
go to its weight and not its admissibility.
The difference between computer-stored and
computer-generated evidence 
Questions of authenticity often require making a
distinction between computer-stored evidence and
computer-generated evidence.77 Computer-stored
evidence includes documents that were created by a
human being and that just happen to be stored in
electronic form.78 Examples include word-processing
files, e-mails, and internet chat room messages.
Computer-generated evidence, on the other hand,
consists of the direct output of computer programs.79
Examples include the login record of an ISP, automated
telephone call records, and automatic teller receipts.
Finally, some evidence may combine both forms. For
example, a financial spreadsheet contains both the
input data provided by a person and the output of a
computer program.80
Authentication of computer-stored evidence
To authenticate computer-stored evidence, the
proponent must identify the author of the record and
show that it has not undergone any significant
changes.81 Both of these points can be shown through
chain-of-custody testimony and other circumstantial
evidence. Federal Rule of Evidence 901(b)(1) provides for
authentication through “testimony of a witness with
knowledge” that “a matter is what it is claimed to be.”
For example, the prosecution in a criminal drug case
may want to authenticate records of illegal drug
transactions found in a computer seized from the
defendant. The prosecution’s authentication witness
does not have to show how the computer was
programmed or how the records were actually entered
into the computer. Instead, the prosecution must
establish two main points: the computer was found in
the defendant’s possession and the names used match
those associated through other evidence with the drug
transaction, and that the records are actually those
found on that computer.82 The former can usually be
established by the officer investigating the case, while
the latter can be established by a digital evidence
specialist who examined the computer.
However, courts will exclude evidence when
unsatisfied with explanations of the digital record-
keeping system. In In re Vee Vinhnee, 336 B.R. 437,
448-49 (9th Cir. 2005), the court excluded American
Express credit card billing statements because “[t]here
is no information regarding American Express’ computer
policy and system control procedures, including control
of access to the pertinent databases, control of access
to the pertinent programs, recording and logging of
changes to the data, backup practices, and audit
procedures utilized to assure the continuing integrity of
the records.” The proponent of such evidence needs to
take care to persuade the court that the digital records
are securely maintained and not subject to alteration.83
Authentication becomes more difficult when the
proponent claims that a certain person wrote it. For
example, consider how to introduce into evidence a
transcript of an internet chat-room conversation
between two men, one of whom the prosecution alleges
was the defendant. Using on-line aliases, the two men
did not reveal their true identities on the transcript, so
authentication will depend on circumstantial evidence.
Perhaps evidence seized from the defendant’s residence
confirms something he said in the chat room. Also,
information obtained from the ISP may be sufficient to
show authorship.84
E-mails
E-mails are a form of computer-stored evidence. They
are generally offered as written print-outs from a
computer rather than through bringing the actual
electronic image into court. Authenticating the e-mail
itself is a simple matter of having a witness testify that
he or she has seen the original and that the print-out is
an accurate reproduction. However, authentication
28 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, Vol 7 © Pario Communications Limited, 2010
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76 United States v. Blackwood, 878 F.2d 1200, 1202
(9th Cir. 1989).
77 ‘Digital Evidence in the Courtroom: A Guide for Law
Enforcement & Prosecutors’ (National Institute of
Justice, 2007) (hereinafter referred to as ‘Digital
Evidence’), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/pubs-
sum/211314.htm and Stephen Mason, gen ed,






82 ‘Digital Evidence’ at § 9:9 (West 2010).
83 For further discussion of this case, see Stephen
Mason, gen ed, Electronic Evidence, 4.44 – 4.12.
84 ‘Digital Evidence’.
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becomes more difficult when a prosecutor is trying to
link the e-mail to the defendant, and the defendant
denies authorship. In this situation, other evidence
must be used. Certainly testimony by a witness who
saw the defendant write and send the e-mail
communication would suffice. That is rare, however.
More common are circumstances where the sending
computer is owned by the defendant, seized from the
defendant’s possession, or linked to the defendant
through other compelling facts. This may be enough to
authenticate the e-mail as one sent by the defendant.
However, if it is a computer to which others had access,
a court may require additional evidence linking the
defendant to the e-mail in question.85 For example, if it
can be shown that the defendant was the one using the
computer at the time the message was sent, this should
suffice.86
Prosecutors sometimes call technical witnesses who
can trace the e-mail in question. “A technical witness
may rely on the coded Internet Protocol Address
appearing in the e-mail header and trace it back to the
internet service provider who relayed the message and
sometimes back to a particular computer.”87 The most
common method of authenticating e-mails is under Fed.
R. Evid. 901(b)(4), by showing “appearance, contents,
substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive
characteristics, taken in conjunction with
circumstances.” An example of this can be found in U.S.
v. Safavian, 435 F. Supp.2d 36 (D.D.C. 2006). In that
case, e-mails were authenticated by four distinctive
characteristics: the actual e-mail address; the name of
the person connected to that address; the names of the
senders and receiver in the e-mail; and their content,
which discussed matters relating to individuals in
question.
By itself, the fact that a person’s name appears in the
header as the “sender” is not enough, because it is so
easy to alter the header. In Victaulic Co. v. Tieman, 499
F.3d 227, 236 (3d Cir. 2007), the Third Circuit held that
the trial court erred in taking judicial notice of facts
about the plaintiff’s company based on its web site,
because anyone may purchase a web address. The
Circuit pointed out that the presence of a trade name in
the URL does not authenticate a web site, and held that
judicial notice is permitted only from sources not
subject to reasonable dispute. Stronger circumstantial
evidence would be a showing that the actual e-mail
address, e.g., mailto:johndoe@aol.com, matches an
account in that person’s name with the indicated
internet service provider, although this is not
necessarily sufficient by itself because it is not
technically difficult to send an e-mail message using
another’s e-mail address.88 
Courts have often relied on the content of the
message as a basis for authenticating e-mails, for which
see U.S. v. Safavian, 435 F.Supp. 36, 39-40 (D.D.C. 2006)
where e-mails were authenticated in part by their
content which discussed personal and professional
matters relating to individuals in question. If an e-mail
contains particular information that only the purported
sender is likely to know, this will authenticate the e-mail
to the same extent that such knowledge would
authenticate a written message.89 Obviously the more
specialized or unique the information, the more such
content tends to authenticate the message as being
from a particular sender who has such knowledge.90 A
reply e-mail can often be used for authentication
purposes. “An e-mail purporting to be a reply to an
earlier message sent to a particular person is likely to
be authored by that person.”91 Often an e-mail message
will include the message to which it is responding as an
attachment or even in the body of the message. Even
though it is possible that a reply is sent by a person
other than the recipient of the original message, the
danger is no greater here than for hand-written or typed
messages.92
Authentication of computer-generated evidence 
The authentication of computer-generated evidence is
governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 901(b)(9) which
provides for authentication by “[e]vidence describing a
process or system used to produce a result and showing
that the process or system produces an accurate
result.” Authentication under Fed. R. Evid. 901(b)(9) can
generally be accomplished by evidence that: (1) the
computer equipment is accepted in the field as standard
and competent and was in good working order;93 (2)
qualified computer operators were employed; (3) proper
procedures were followed in connection with the input




88 Federal Rule of Evidence 901(a) at § 9:9.
89 As in the English case of R v Mawji (Rizwan) [2003]
EWCA Crim 3067, [2003] All ER (D) 285 (Oct), 2003
WL 22477344 (CA (Crim Div)) discussed in
Stephen Mason, gen ed, Electronic Evidence, 4.14.
90 U.S. v. Siddiqui, 235 F.3d 1318, 1322, (11th Cir.
2000) (e-mails authenticated as written by
defendant because they showed knowledge of
actions only the defendant would be likely to be
aware of, apologized for things the defendant
himself had done, came from his e-mail address,
and were signed with his distinctive nickname).
91 Federal Rule of Evidence 901(a) at § 9:9.
92 Federal Rule of Evidence 901(a) at § 9:9.
93 Note the discussion of this topic in Stephen
Mason, gen ed, Electronic Evidence, Chapter 5.
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program was utilized; (5) the equipment was
programmed and operated correctly; and (6) the exhibit
is properly identified as the output in question.94 
Not all courts require each of these, however. The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that “[i]t is not
necessary that the computer programmer testify in
order to authenticate computer-generated records.”95 A
computer print-out may be authenticated by “one who
has knowledge of the particular record system.”96
Similarly, a party “need not produce expert testimony as
to [the] mechanical accuracy of [a] computer where it
presented evidence that [the] computer was sufficiently
accurate [so that the] company relied upon it in
conducting its business.”97 In the U-Haul case, an
insurance manager testified about computer-generated
summaries produced by his company. He testified
regarding the process of inputting data into the
computer and the process of querying the computer to
compile the information to create the summaries. He
testified that he was familiar with the record keeping
practices of the company, and explained both the
computer system used to compile and search the
insurance claim records, and the process of querying
the computer system to create the summaries that were
admitted at trial. The court found this sufficient under
Rule 901 to authenticate the summaries.98
Hearsay issues
Computer-stored evidence and hearsay
If the computer-stored evidence contains statements
made by a person and is offered to prove the truth of
the matter asserted, it is hearsay under Federal Rule of
Evidence 801(c), unless it is offered against a party and
is that party’s own statement (Rule 801(d)(2)) or is a
certain type of statement by a witness (Rule 801(d)(1).
Under Rule 802, hearsay is not admissible unless it falls
within the exceptions contained in Rule 803.
The most common hearsay exception for computer-
stored records is the business records exception
contained in Rule 803(6).99 “It is immaterial that the
business record is maintained in a computer rather than
in company books.”100 To establish the foundation for
this exception, the prosecution must show that: (1) the
computer equipment (hardware and software) on which
the record was stored is recognized as standard in the
field or reliable;101 (2) the data were entered by a person
with knowledge in the regular course of business at or
reasonably near the time of the occurrence of the event
recorded; and (3) the sources on which the record was
based, as well as the method and time of preparation
indicate that the record is trustworthy and its admission
is justified.102
While many attorneys practicing in the United States
routinely argue that the business records exception
covers any document which a company maintains in its
files, the exception is actually much narrower than that.
It is limited only to the data which the business entity
routinely enters or maintains in its files or computers in
the ordinary course of its operations. But even with this
limitation, it is of great value to the litigator who is
seeking to introduce computer-stored records from a
business operation.
Computer-generated evidence and hearsay
The hearsay rule applies to “computer-generated
evidence which repeats or contains human declarations.
Evidence to which this hearsay rule may apply includes
accounting records, invoices, summaries or any other
types of computer output which reiterate human
declarations which have been inputted into the
computer.”103 The business record exception contained
in Rule 803(6) applies not only to computer-stored
evidence, as discussed above, but also to computer-
generated evidence.104 There are situations, however,
where computer-generated evidence is not hearsay. For
example, the issue may center on the computer key
strokes themselves – that is, what the key strokes were,
or, perhaps, when and at which terminal they were
made. The human making the key strokes is not a
declarant, because he is not making a statement about
the transaction; he is performing the transaction itself.
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94 Federal Rule of Evidence 901(a) at 9:20.
95 U-Haul v. Lumbermens, 576 F.3d 1040 (9th Cir.
2009).
96 U-Haul v. Lumbermens, 576 F.3d 1040 (9th Cir.
2009).
97 U-Haul v. Lumbermens, 576 F.3d 1040 (9th Cir.
2009); although on this matter, note the
comments by George L. Paul, Foundations of
Digital Evidence (American Bar Association, 2008)
p 129 and Stephen Mason, gen ed, Electronic
Evidence, Chapter 5.
98 U-Haul v. Lumbermens, 576 F.3d 1040 (9th Cir.
2009).
99 ‘Digital Evidence’, p 31.
100 Sea-Land Service Inc. v. Lozen Intern. LLC, 285 F.3d
808 (9th Cir. 2002).
101 Note the discussion of ‘reliability’ in Stephen
Mason, gen ed, Electronic Evidence, Chapter 5.
102 Sea-Land Service Inc. v. Lozen Intern. LLC, 285 F.3d
808 (9th Cir. 2002).
103 Teneille Brown and Emily Murphy, ‘Through a
Scanner Darkly:Functional Neuroimaging as
Evidence of Criminal Defendant’s Mental States’,
62(4) Stanford Law Review, 1119-1208 at fn 131
(April 2010).
104 U-Haul v. Lumbermens, 576 F.3d 1040 (9th Cir.
2009) at 1043-45 (holding that computer data
compiled in the ordinary course of business,
summarized in computer-generated reports, and
presented in computer print-outs prepared for trial
is admissible under Rule 803(6)); see also B.
Weinstein and M. A. Berger, Weinstein’s Federal
Evidence § 901.08[1] (2d. ed.2006) (stating that
“print-outs prepared specifically for litigation from
databases that were compiled in the ordinary
course of business are admissible as business
records to the same extent as if the print-outs
were, themselves, prepared in the ordinary course
of business. The important issue is whether the
database, not the print-out from the database,
was compiled in the ordinary course of business”).
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If, then, a computer records the key strokes, processes
them, and produces a print-out purporting to indicate
what they were, such a print-out is not hearsay.105 The
admissibility of the print-out depends on authentication
under Rule 901: If the computer hardware and software
are electronically and mechanically sound, the print-out
will be an accurate portrayal of the transaction; if they
are unsound, it may not be.
Search and seizure
Digital evidence exists in many forms. The form sought
by law enforcement agents will be critical to the legality
of the seizure. For example, the agents may only want to
seize a particular computer. That hard drive, however,
may not contain what they are looking for; critical data
may be stored on a network. Even stored data may be
insufficient and additional information in the form of
real-time traffic data – log-in times and dates, and ISP
addresses collected from a service provider – might be
critical to an investigation. Finally, law enforcement may
want to seize not only the traffic data of digital
messages, but also their content. Governing these
searches and seizures are a variety of federal statues
and the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. If
the search and seizure violates these authorities, the
evidence that is seized may be excluded from evidence,
although that is not always required. This section will
discuss the governing authorities.
Wiretap Act
The Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2510, governs the seizure of
the content of digital messages. For example, police can
install “sniffer” software that captures a hacker’s instant
messages.106 The Wiretap Act prohibits anyone in the
United States from intercepting the contents of wire,
oral, or electronic communications. Violation of the Act
can lead to criminal and civil penalties. For example, the
Act was violated by a defendant who copied e-mail
messages existing on a third-party provider’s hard drive
awaiting delivery to recipients.107 The one exception is
that interception may be authorized by an order of a
court of competent jurisdiction. The Wiretap Act
contains strict requirements for judicial approval. It
requires advance approval by a federal judge, and is
substantially stricter than the requirements for
obtaining a warrant to search tangible property. Before
issuing authorization under the Wiretap Act, the federal
judge must find:
a) Probable cause to believe that an individual is
committing, has committed, or will commit, one of a
list of specified crimes;
b) Probable cause that the communications
concerning the offense will be obtained through the
interception;
c) That normal investigative techniques have been
tried and failed, or are unlikely to succeed, or are
too dangerous; and
d) Probable cause that the facilities from which the
communications are to be intercepted are being
used in connection with the commission of the
crime.108 
Interception becomes an integral part of the
investigation after other investigative techniques fail.
Pen Register and Trap and Trace Statue 
The seizure of real-time traffic data – dialing, routing,
addressing, and signaling information provided by a
communications service provider – is governed by the
Pen Register and Trap & Trace Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3121.
This statute does not govern the seizure of content. A
pen register records the outgoing connection
information such as the telephone number dialed by a
person under surveillance.109 A Trap & Trace device
records the incoming connection information such as
the telephone number of the party who is calling the
person under surveillance.  The statute generally
prohibits the nonconsensual real-time acquisition of
non-content information by any person about a wire or
electronic communication unless a statutory exception
applies.110 When no exception applies, law enforcement
officers must obtain a pen/trap order from the court
before acquiring noncontent information covered by the
statute.111 Note that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
has held that even if the pen register statute was
violated, the statute does not require suppression of the
evidence seized – providing it is merely traffic data and
not content.112
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106 ‘Digital Evidence’, p 34.
107 U.S. v. Councilman, 418 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2005) (en
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108 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(a)-(d).
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Stored communications provisions of the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act
The Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (and
following), protects individuals’ privacy and proprietary
interests. The Act protects users whose electronic
communications are in electronic storage with an ISP or
other electronic communications facility.113 The Act
applies when law enforcement officials seek to obtain
records about a customer or subscriber from a
communication service provider.114 For example, the Act
may apply when law enforcement seeks to obtain
copies of a customer’s e-mails from an internet service
provider. Note that the act would not apply if the seizure
of the e-mails was from the customer’s own computer.115
Under the Act, the production of some information may
be compelled by subpoena, some by court order, and
some by search warrant. The more sensitive the
information, the higher the level of legal process
required to compel disclosure.116
Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides that: “the right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the
person or things to be seized.” In very general terms,
the Fourth Amendment is construed as prohibiting the
search or seizure of an individual or their property,
unless a warrant is first obtained from a judge or the
circumstances fall within a very limited number of
situations where a warrant is deemed unnecessary – the
“exceptions” to the search warrant requirement. This
protection is extended to all activities and objects in
which an individual has a reasonable expectation of
privacy.
A warrant authorizing the search and seizure of
computers or computer equipment must be supported
by probable cause. It also must be sufficiently particular
in its description of the digital evidence sought. A
warrant violates the particularity requirement when, for
example, it contains no restrictions on the search, no
references to statutes, and no references to crimes or
illegality.117 Similarly, a warrant was found to be an over-
broad “catch-all” warrant when it called for the seizure
of all computers, all computer storage devices, and all
computer software systems.118 Finally, a warrant
authorizing a search of the text files of a computer for
documentary evidence pertaining to a specific crime will
not authorize a search of image files containing
evidence of other criminal activity.
Warrants for digital evidence in the Ninth Circuit 
Given the cases just discussed, the government cannot
just obtain a warrant to seize a computer and then
rummage through it looking for evidence of a crime;
rather, the government must specifically describe the
evidence it seeks. But even when the warrant is specific,
agents often must search through much unrelated
material on the computer to find the specific material
the warrant covers. Sometimes the unrelated material
they view will be evidence of a crime. In such instances,
the material is not covered by the warrant, and so the
seizure of such material violates the Fourth Amendment
unless an exception applies. Agents have claimed that
the “plain view” doctrine applies – if evidence is in plain
view, and is incriminating on its face, a warrant is not
required.119 If the courts accept the claim, law
enforcement agents may have an incentive to seize
more rather than less. One court described the issue
this way: “Let’s take everything back to the lab, have a
good look around and see what we might stumble
upon.”120 
Concerned about this perverse incentive, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals has imposed limitations on how
the “plain view” doctrine applies in this setting. “To
avoid this illogical result, the government should, in
future warrant applications, forswear reliance on the
plain view doctrine or any similar doctrine that would
allow it to retain data to which it has gained access only
because it was required to segregate seizable from non-
seizable data. If the government doesn’t consent to
such a waiver, the magistrate judge should order that
the seizable and non-seizable data be separated by an
independent third party under the supervision of the
court, or deny the warrant altogether.”121 
Searches without a warrant
While the Fourth Amendment generally requires a
warrant, there are exceptions for: (1) consensual
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searches, (2) exigent circumstances, (3) searches
incident to arrest, (4) inventory searches, (5) and
evidence seized under the plain view doctrine.122 A
voluntary consent will validate a warrantless search of a
computer. Yet the scope of the search must not exceed
the scope of the consent.123 The government bears the
burden of showing that the search did not exceed the
scope of the consent.124 If the law enforcement officials
have a combination of probable cause and exigent
circumstances, they can conduct a warrantless search of
a residence.125 The term “probable cause” requires that
under the “totality of circumstances” known to the
officers at the time they entered the residence, there
was a “fair probability” that contraband or evidence of a
crime would be found inside.126 Exigency only exists in a
few emergency situations such as the hot pursuit of a
fleeing felon or a reasonable fear that without
immediate seizure the evidence will be destroyed while
a warrant is obtained.127
Traffic data and the Fourth Amendment 
The United States Supreme Court has held that the use
of a pen register to capture numbers dialed from a
telephone line does not constitute a search for Fourth
Amendment purposes.128 According to the court, people
do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
telephone numbers they dial because they “realize that
they must ‘convey’ phone numbers to the telephone
company, since it is through telephone company
switching equipment that their calls are completed.”129
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has extended this
ruling to apply to the capture of digital traffic data such
as the to and from addresses of e-mail messages, the IP
addresses of web sites visited and the total amount of
data transmitted to or from an account.130 The Circuit
reasoned that “e-mail and Internet users have no
expectation of privacy in the to/from addresses of their
messages or the IP addresses of the web sites they visit
because they should know that this information is
provided to and used by Internet service providers for
the specific purpose of directing the routing of
information.”131 It was critical to the Circuit that no
content was intercepted.
Conclusion: the role of the independent
judiciary 
As discussed, the threat of cybercrime is one that is
both constantly increasing and evolving. One important
aspect that is critical to mounting an adequate response
to this threat is investigative and legal knowledge. The
other critical element is that of an active and
independent judiciary providing necessary oversight.
The tools of the cyber-criminal – technology and
anonymity – have also become important assets in the
range of responses of law enforcement. Moreover, much
like traditional police work, many cybercrime
investigations require investigators to go under-cover.
Under federal law, warrants crucial to executing an
effective investigation must be specifically approved in
advance by a federal district judge or magistrate judge.
Issues may arise in under-cover operations as to
whether the law enforcement activities constituted
entrapment or otherwise violated the rights of the
accused. A federal judge will often be charged with
making that difficult decision.
What is at issue, perhaps, is the role and attitude of
the judiciary in dealing with cybercrime. At first blush, it
may appear that the contents of this article may
encourage an active role for the judiciary. Indeed, the
challenges of investigating and prosecuting such
activities would suggest the appropriateness or even
the necessity of such an active role. However, whenever
a federal judge begins to feel a bit of a kinship with the
prosecutors who appear in their court, they should
remind themselves of the words of Byron White, a
former member of the U.S. Supreme Court, when he
pronounced firmly that, “[j]udges and magistrates are
not adjuncts to the law enforcement team; as neutral
judicial officers, they have no stake in the outcome of
particular criminal prosecutions.”132
A truly independent judiciary is essential to the
criminal justice system for at least three reasons.
First, it ensures that the rights of participants in our
legal systems will not be abused. This has been the
primary role of the federal judicial system from the
founding of our country. Indeed, it was the abuse of
search warrants which provided one of the precipitating
122 ‘Digital Evidence’, pp 9-10.
123 United States v. McWeeney, 454 F.3d 1030, 1034
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124 See generally United States v. Reid, 226 F.3d 1020,
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causes for our War of Independence. This role of the
judiciary, as the bulwark which protects the rights of
ordinary citizens, continues to be a hallmark of the
American legal system.
Second, an independent magistrate overseeing
criminal investigation will lead to great professionalism
on the part of criminal investigators and prosecutors.
This has come to be an accepted view among
prosecutors and investigators in the United States. In
recent years, the U.S. Supreme Court has had occasion
to re-examine133 one of the most significant precedent
requiring judicial oversight of police investigative
techniques – Miranda v. Arizona 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Miranda requires that a suspect’s confession cannot be
used against him at trial unless he was advised of his
right to remain silent. In addition, conservative legal
scholars have called for reversal of the 1961 decision of
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), which requires the
exclusion of evidence obtained without a warrant in
violation of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution. When the Miranda and Mapp decisions
were issued by the Supreme Court, there was a great
deal of protest. The view was commonly expressed that
they would reduce the effectiveness of the police in
their efforts to deal with crime. However, despite
conservative dissatisfaction, the Supreme Court, in a 7-2
decision, declined to reverse Miranda. And there has
been a surprising lack of support in the law enforcement
community for overturning either Mapp or Miranda.
Perhaps that it is because the law enforcement
community has come to realize that judicial oversight
resulting from these decisions has led to increased
professionalism in law enforcement, enhanced accuracy
in the outcome of criminal investigations, and greater
long-term success in dealing with crime.
Third, the independent judiciary offers legitimacy to
the criminal justice system and our legal institutions.
Although the United States judiciary takes pride in its
commitment to the Rule of Law, it also recognizes that
its commitment to that fundamental principle means
very little if the public have serious reservations about
the legitimacy, even-handedness, and fairness of our
criminal justice systems. Knowledge that a truly
independent judiciary provides real and meaningful
oversight of criminal investigations creates greater
respect for our legal system at all levels.
Thus, despite the need to ensure that critical
personnel are proactive in acquiring the technological,
investigative, and legal prowess required to ferret out
and address cybercrime, it is critical that the judiciary
maintain its independent role to prevent investigative
abuses, improve the quality of law enforcement, and
lend credibility to law enforcement activities.
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